Lt Col Syed Iftikhar Ahmed served 32 years in the Pakistan Army and earnestly in Kashmir during calm and chaos. The Author’s work is a singular account of his experience as a soldier who took part in the Kashmir operation before the 1965 war, the 1965 war itself, and the 1971 war, during which he observed evil Indian designs.

This text thoroughly analyzes the lengthy Kashmir dispute and a transparent historical background outlining the different aspects of this protracted war. It deconstructs the variety of political options available to Pakistan and India, delves into the philosophical underpinnings of Hindutva, and considers the ramifications for regional peace. It details thinking about a fourth Indo-Pak war and examining the security environment following the Pulwama attack. The book offers a solid argument in support of a hybrid approach that incorporates both deterrence and diplomacy as a practical answer to the protracted Kashmir Conflict.

It allows readers to experience the Kashmir conflict through the eyes of a soldier while providing a contentious yet intriguing viewpoint

Which intellectual and historical underpinnings support Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir? What injustices are implied by India’s statements over Kashmir? What options are there for Pakistan and India? What are the chances of Kashmir being independent? What prospects exist for peace in the region? How might Pakistan establish a battle-strength edge over the more powerful foe in the fourth and final conflict between Pakistan and India? While it may be challenging to find concrete solutions to some of these concerns, this book can assist readers in thinking about them. Since it allows readers to experience the Kashmir conflict through the eyes of a soldier while providing a contentious yet intriguing viewpoint.

Kashmir has always been treated like a jagir, passed from one Maharaja to the next without any consideration for the welfare of Kashmiris

Kashmir has always been treated like a jagir, passed from one Maharaja to the next without any consideration for the welfare of Kashmiris. Raja Dhian Singh, the brother of Gulab Singh, received a Poonch from Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Gulab Singh later accepted it, and Jawahar Singh and Hari Singh claimed it. When Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession, he continued the ancient practice of treating Kashmir as a Jagir and completely disregarded the “Majority Principle” outlined in the Partition Plan. According to the “Majority Principle, princely state leaders must consider the majority of their citizens while deciding whether to join Pakistan or India’s sphere of influence.

Interestingly, when Muslim rulers of the predominantly Hindu states of Hyderabad and Junagadh expressed interest in joining Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten upheld and stressed this idea. However, he ignored a similar principle when Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession to join India against the will of the Kashmiri population, which is predominantly Muslim. Instead, he was in charge of military operations in Kashmir when the underprivileged Kashmiris turned to violence to defend the self-determination that Maharaja Hari Singh had denied them. The historical practice of treating Kashmir as a Jagir was coupled with oppression and unfair policies, including enforced taxes, oppressive autocracy, refusal to accept Muslim soldiers in the army, and enforcement of harsh penalties for failing to pay enforced taxes, which exacerbated the problems. Later, the British continued a similar abuse and neglect trend.

The Author describes the Radcliffe Award as a “typical instance of Hindu-British collusion” and a “black mark in the name of fair play and justice.”

Lord Mountbatten and Radcliffe assisted in the unjust demarcation of Pakistan and India’s borders, depriving Pakistan of its legitimate Muslim-majority states, including the tehsils of Ajnala in the Amritsar district, Nakodar and Jullundur in the Jullundur district, and Ferozepur and Zira in the Ferozepur district. Since giving India Batala, it had been meticulously planned against Pakistan, and Gurdaspur Tehsil provided her with a direct road to Kashmir. The Author describes the Radcliffe Award as a “typical instance of Hindu-British collusion” and a “black mark in the name of fair play and justice.”

The book looks into choices Pakistan and India might have in the current situation. The Author suggests that Pakistan has four options: avoid war through diplomacy while assisting Kashmiri freedom fighters, wage a limited war in Kashmir akin to the one in 1948, expand the conflict into Indian territory if India declares war on Pakistan, or launch a sizable pre-emptive strike to thwart the Indian offensive once it is clear that India is headed for war. The choices available to India are to either reinstate Article 370 and 35A, acknowledge that the Kashmir issue must be resolved, or continue with the “no war, no peace” stance and continue to fight for freedom, ultimately risking defeat in a fourth war with Pakistan and the unavoidable division of India into Khalistan, Nagaland, Gorkhaland, Microz, Tamil Nadu, Niral Bari, and other separatist movements.

The book also looks at alleged Indian-sponsored options, such as modifying the Line of Control to become an international border, giving Kashmir to Pakistan and Jammu to India, or putting the region under UN trusteeship for 18 to 25 years. These methods do little more than exacerbate the problem of self-determination. When Hyderabad was denied the choice of independence that appeared to be provided to princely states after Partition, a separate possibility of an independent Kashmir was ruled out.

India carefully considered its intention to repeal Articles 370 and 35A after examining the methods used in Spain and Israel to make the Muslim majority into a minority

India carefully considered its intention to repeal Articles 370 and 35A after examining the methods used in Spain and Israel to make the Muslim majority into a minority. Since Indira Gandhi’s presidency, this issue has been researched in India and is currently being used to repeal Articles 370 and 35A. The same strategy is employed in Palestine to convert the 8% of Jews living there into a majority by recruiting Jews worldwide to the so-called Promised Land. No discussions with India must start before Articles 370 and 35A are reinstated.

It is difficult to predict when the fourth war will start

According to the Author, Pakistan can no longer afford to discuss the weather, culture, and food when confidence-building measures are in place and the problem is ignored. It is difficult to predict when the fourth war will start. Thus, it could start anytime. The size of the troops is not what matters in a battle situation. Neither is war determined by mathematical formulae nor is battle a fight of just physical power. Although physical strength and size are not meant to be taken lightly, they are not the only deciding factors. The book attempts to provide historical instances from 331 BC through the Taliban triumph in Afghanistan to support this claim. In each case, lesser troops defeated their foe decisively by producing a superior battle power.

We must remain open to debate and diplomacy, but at the same time, potential aggressors must be aware that they will pay dearly and suffer irreparable harm if they attempt to impose a choice

In light of the likelihood of war, the Author emphasizes the value of being prepared and discusses tactics, including pre-emptive strikes, deep infiltration, indirect strategy, and a war at the national level. The text emphasizes the importance of willpower, nuclear awareness, good leadership, a realistic approach, confidence in Allah, one’s country, and oneself on a population level.

According to the book, Pakistan should constantly be ready for conflict with Indians. We must remain open to debate and diplomacy, but at the same time, potential aggressors must be aware that they will pay dearly and suffer irreparable harm if they attempt to impose a choice. The book examines the intricate interplay of issues impacting the area and was authored by a former Kashmiri freedom fighter with knowledge of its difficulties. It doubts Kashmir’s prospects for independence and the need to address the problem’s root rather than ignore it during discussions.

Pakistan will renege on the Shimla Agreement, the likelihood that Kashmir will become a sovereign state and military readiness for conflict in a nuclear environment

This serves as a sobering reminder of the negotiations’ futility without a genuine commitment to resolution. It challenges conventional wisdom and encourages readers to think critically about the possibility that Pakistan will renege on the Shimla Agreement, the likelihood that Kashmir will become a sovereign state and military readiness for conflict in a nuclear environment. It is an essential addition to the libraries of academics, decision-makers, and those interested in the complexity of this 76-year-old struggle since it is a tale that stimulates intellectual discussion.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.