On June 3rd, Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban’s de facto government officially and announced energy and transit-related projects with Kabul at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. It marked an unprecedented shift in Moscow’s approach to Kabul. The Taliban was a world pariah group under United Nations sanctions for around 20 years; little could they imagine that able-bodied politicians were starting to woo them. In the Russian case, cooperation with the Taliban is more to do with hard interests gained in Central Asia where it curbs Western influence and protects its southern flank against the spread of instability.
Russia becomes the first country to accredit a Taliban government, signaling a new era of pragmatic engagement over ideological distance.
The pragmatic approach to the Taliban, Russia did not start from scratch. Moscow has continued to operate an embassy in Kabul, stay in frequent diplomatic contact, and already, in a guarded fashion, cooperate with Taliban rule since they seized power in August 2021. “Russia becomes the first country to accredit a Taliban government”. This move gained speed in March 2024 when the Special Presidential Envoy of Russia on Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov stated, “The Taliban are a reality we cannot ignore, and constructive engagement serves the region’s stability.” This was stated with a lot of diplomatic hedging but made clear as Moscow pursued a realpolitik policy which could be characterized by its terrorism, drug trafficking and regional security concerns.
Three main factors form Russia’s calculus. To very first, Moscow sees the Taliban as a possible shield against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), which has posed a security problem to the region with its activities in Afghanistan. The Taliban, being extremists in the past, have in turn aligned themselves against ISIS-K, with Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid telling reporters in January 2024 that: “We will never allow anyone to use Afghanistan land against any other state, including Russia.” In the case of Moscow, which has countless ISIS cells threat inside its borders, such as the attacks in Dagestan and the ISIS-claimed Crocus City Hall disaster in March 2024. The Taliban’s position against ISIS-K binds together the Taliban and Moscow in combating terrorism.
Second, the Russian Government considers the Taliban power in Afghanistan as a means to gain more influence in the economic situation in the region because, under the Western sanctions, due to its trade routes being blocked, Moscow cannot develop the same patterns of trade and business. Afghanistan potentially provides transit links between Russia and South Asia and Taliban officials even talked about being involved in regional connectivity projects openly.
In October 2023, Taliban Minister of Industry and Trade Nooruddin Azizi came to Moscow and offered that Afghanistan become the passage in trade routes, and he said, “Afghanistan wants to be a transit route between the countries of Central and South Asia, and Russia can take benefit out of the geography. Even though the infrastructure problems in Afghanistan are very acute, Moscow has been interested in barter trade relations in relation to fuel, wheat, and Afghan ores, which could allow both parties breathing room in terms of economy under the sanctions and isolation.
The Taliban’s stance against ISIS-K aligns with Russia’s urgent counterterrorism concerns following the Dagestan and Crocus City Hall attacks.
Third, the emerging Sino-Russian alliance is influencing the policy of Moscow. China is gradually extending its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and trying to stretch the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan. Russia perceives an advantage of aligning the regional connectivity processes and acts as a supplementary stakeholder, but not a competitor to China. This area of common interest was reflected in the Moscow Format Consultations held in February 2024 in which both the Russian and Chinese side expressed the desire to involve the Taliban to maintain stability and connectivity in the region and according to the Chinese envoy Yue Xiaoyong, this area of common interest is the view of China and Russia that “stability in Afghanistan is in the centre of regional prosperity.”
Nevertheless, Russia incurs risks in its dealings with the Taliban. Despite the Taliban guarantees ISIS-K has only increased the scope of attacks to shelling those at the Pakistan-Tajikistan border, and the persecution of Shia minorities in Afghanistan has remained unabated. In addition, the uncompromising rule by the Taliban, denigration of women in their lives, and continuous oppression have led to Afghanistan a deep-seated seclusion on the international front. Russia taking its relationship with the Taliban further can sour the ties with other members of the region, especially India, which is still wary of Taliban designs, and Iran, which has been complaining about water issues against the Taliban in recent months.
However, Moscow seems to want to cope with these contradictions. In May 2024, participating in a press briefing, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explained, “At this point, there is no recognition of the Taliban, but productive work with the Taliban is in the interests of both the Russian Federation and the region in term of security and economic.” Such a position will enable Moscow to evade the political consequences of de facto acknowledgment while strengthening practical collaboration.
The Taliban Moscow card plays its part in this evolving landscape. With the looming of economic collapse, and humanitarian crises, and despite the refusal to be recognized as an independent state by much of the world, the Taliban view Russia as an important partner that can offer trade opportunities, recognition to be used in politics as well as offer a platform to access other regional players. The presence of Moscow in the UN Security Council and its membership in multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can lend credence to the fact that the Taliban is trying to shun their past of isolationism and become a recognized entity.
Moscow views Afghanistan as a critical transit hub for trade between Central and South Asia under sanctions-induced economic constraints.
Taliban tend to fall into the trap of overplaying their cards as well. Russia does not have any ideological or strategic interests in Afghanistan but purely transactional to enjoy the cooperation of the Taliban in its counterterrorism efforts and at the same time to hedge by strengthening relations with the Central Asian republics. This can be demonstrated when Russia has been carrying out massive military drills in Tajikistan in April 2024, indicating that it is prepared to interfere should Taliban-linked mayhem encroach on its realm of security.
Taliban efforts to bring Russia to their side also overlap with Moscow’s ambitions to weaken the Western influence in the area. Through sharing small talk with the Taliban and favoring the regional formats that leave the United States on the sidelines, Moscow seeks to fill the vacuum of Washington and enhance the level of its diplomatic authority. It also enables Russia to pose as a responsible stakeholder who is interested in cooperating with de facto authorities in stabilizing the region to distinguish itself from the perceived approach of the West, as based on conditionality and isolation.
The transition of the Taliban, which became a partner and not a pariah in the Russian calculus. It is a narrative of transactional convenience and not a story of shared values. In the case of Russia, the Taliban are a competent entity that can be controlled to stabilise the region, promote trade, and contain Western influence. To the Taliban, “Moscow means a window to regional integration, economic bearer of relief and a possible diplomatic legitimator.”
The viability of this new relationship will hinge on how the Taliban will be able to contain extremist forces, how it will handle internal stability within Afghanistan, and how it will slowly conform to the international community. A failure in any of these areas will restrain the scope of engagement Moscow can have with Afghanistan. The increase in regional tensions because of the Afghanistan conflict can transform a wary relationship into a liability to the Russian government.
Russia’s Taliban policy is a tale of strategic necessity, not shared values, a partnership born of shifting interests, not moral alignment.
The world witnessed the “gradual economic decline of Afghanistan, the growing humanitarian problems, and the security crisis persisting in the country, The practical approach of Russia toward the Taliban will most likely remain ideologically unrelated but based on considerations of security, economy, and politics. This changing relationship brings out a fundamental fact of international politics in our changing times: pariahs and partners may switch roles when the times are right, but the partnership is as temporary as the interests that make up its foundation.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
