The May 7–10, 2025, India-Pakistan clash was the most serious military crisis between the nuclear rivals in decades. Indian forces launched cross-border strikes during Operation Sindoor in retaliation for a Kashmir militant attack, and Pakistan responded with artillery, missile, and drone attacks on India. Although both sides claimed tactical success, the conflict unfolded under the nuclear “umbrella” without either side resorting to nuclear weapons or explicitly breaking the taboo on their use.
Pakistan’s NCA convening was a strategic bluff to reinforce red lines and invite external mediation, not nuclear preparation.
A US-mediated ceasefire was declared by the evening of May 10. Amid this escalation, Pakistan’s announcement of an emergency National Command Authority (NCA) meeting on May 10 briefly raised fears of nuclear escalation. However, Islamabad appears to have used the NCA convening as calibrated deterrent signaling-a strategic bluff to reinforce Pakistan’s red lines and invite external mediation-rather than preparation for actual nuclear employment.
The crisis began after a terror attack on April 22, 2025, in Indian-administered Kashmir, which India attributed to Pakistan-backed militants. On May 7, India launched missile strikes (Operation Sindoor) against militant camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India said only terrorist targets were hit, but Pakistan reported civilian areas struck and immediately shelled border districts in Jammu, causing civilian casualties. Over the next days, both sides escalated in new ways.
India unleashed unprecedented precision strikes, including BrahMos and SCALP cruise missiles, deep into Pakistan. Pakistan retaliated with conventionally-armed short-range ballistic missiles and large-scale drone attacks on Indian military bases (Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos) on the morning of May 10. Remarkably, despite heavy exchanges, neither side crossed the nuclear threshold. Both armies even avoided manned air combat, and most missile salvos were intercepted or diverted. In short, May 7–10 saw a rapid, multi-domain escalation under the nuclear overhang-new weapons and reach, but stopped well short of any nuclear use.
At 7:30 am Pakistan time on May 10, state media and Reuters reported that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had called an emergency NCA meeting – the first announcement of its kind in the crisis. This alarmed observers because the NCA (chaired by the PM) oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal via the Strategic Plans Division. Within hours, however, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif publicly denied that any meeting had been scheduled.
U.S. officials later revealed that Pakistan’s sudden nuclear warning was quickly followed by intense U.S. diplomacy: Secretary of State Rubio and Vice President Vance were on calls to both sides and brokered a ceasefire. The timing suggests Islamabad deliberately used the NCA convening as a dramatic signal of resolve.
Despite heavy conventional exchanges, neither side crossed the nuclear threshold, maintaining the global taboo on first-use.
Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia expert, said, “signalling intention to convene NCA reflected how much the crisis had escalated and may also have been an indirect call for external mediation,” reinforcing a request for U.S. intervention. Pakistan’s public statements emphasized “maximum restraint” even while taking “precautionary decisions in advance through the NCA to prepare for all scenarios”. In other words, Pakistan framed the NCA alert as a stand-by measure – a warning to India and a signal to Washington – rather than a step toward actual nuclear use.
Pakistan’s behavior in these hours fits its long-standing doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence: it holds the nuclear option as a counter to any threat, even conventional. By invoking the NCA and citing Pakistan’s nuclear capability, civilian and military leaders reinforced India’s perception that further aggression could invoke catastrophic retaliation.
Yet by stopping short of any nuclear movement (and soon rescinding the meeting), Pakistan preserved the nuclear “no-use” barrier. Indeed, Foreign Minister Dar told Reuters that any international alarm was “overblown” and “there should not be” concern, stressing that Pakistan is a “responsible nation” and emphasizing restraint. In short, the NCA convening functioned as a strategic signal, a form of intense conventional messaging under the nuclear shadow, rather than a breach of the nuclear threshold.
The concept of a global nuclear taboo, a normative ban against first-use – has shaped great-power behavior since 1945. In South Asia, the taboo has always been contested. Pakistan’s doctrine explicitly allows small nuclear responses to deter larger conventional strikes, so its public rhetoric often undercuts a strong taboo. Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan have so far refrained from nuclear employment, implying an unspoken mutual understanding of catastrophic consequences. One can observe that “both sides have no interest in violating the nuclear taboo”.
Even as Indian strikes on Pakistan in 2025 reached near Rawalpindi (home to Pakistan’s nuclear command), political and military leaders in both capitals carefully avoided any overt nuclear threats. The 1988 India–Pakistan agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities held firm during the crisis, underscoring that the basic taboo norm remained intact.
Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence doctrine views nuclear weapons as boundary-setters, not war-fighting tools.
Pakistan’s NCA move, then, must be seen in light of this fragile but enduring taboo. Islamabad signaled that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantor of deterrence, but it has no appetite to escalate to use. As one analyst observed, nuclear weapons now function as boundary-setters, not war-fighting tools: crossing the threshold would yield only mutual ruin. Both Delhi and Islamabad recognize that even a limited nuclear exchange is a dangerous illusion given the geography and alert postures. The muted nuclear signaling in May, far below the overt brinkmanship of past crises, suggests the taboo continues to exert influence, even if it is weaker than in other regions.
Looking ahead, Pakistan’s calibrated signaling may actually bolster its deterrence credibility without destroying the taboo. Demonstrating a willingness to mobilize the NCA under threat shows resolve, while stopping short of use reinforces Pakistan’s reputation as a restrained nuclear power. However, analysts caution that South Asian deterrence remains precarious. Belfer Center studies note that modernization of delivery systems and high-alert postures have left “little margin for error”.
The May crisis exposed new escalatory avenues (drones, cruise missiles) that blur traditional boundaries, so both sides will need stronger crisis management. Islamabad’s messaging likely convinced domestic audiences and deterred further Indian strikes in the short term, but it also signals an arms-race dynamic: Pakistan’s logic of “full-spectrum” deterrence invites India to keep probing the limits.
The crisis exposed new escalatory avenues, urging stronger crisis management to avoid future spirals.
In the long run, sustaining stability will require rebuilding institutional channels and confidence-building measures, lest future crises again threaten to spiral. Although the ceasefire holds for now, “the concept of fighting a limited nuclear war…is a dangerous illusion,” and unresolved tensions continue to simmer under the surface.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
