On June 13, Israel launched one of the largest-scale and deeply controversial military operations against Iran. The operation, named The Rising Lion, in which more than 200 aircraft, drones, and precision missiles that were used to strike the nuclear infrastructure and the military command centres within Iran. The targets include enrichment sites around Natanz and Isfahan, important military bases in Tehran, and leadership cells operating at least in contact with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

The Rising Lion… crippled the capability of Iran to make nuclear energy and disrupted command and control systems.

The targeted strikes carried out by the Israeli intelligence, as confirmed by official briefings, devastated sensitive uranium centrifuges, killed senior nuclear scientists and military men who were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC. It severely impaired Iran’s capability to further develop its nuclear program in the short run.

The Israeli government claimed it was a success. Netanyahu announced the mission and said it was one of the largest and most successful military operations in our history. It crippled the capability of Iran to make nuclear energy and disrupted command and control systems. This was echoed by Defense Minister Israel Katz, who pointed out that the attack was meant to send a message to Tehran and its proxies that Israel was not going to stand a threat to its existence.

The Israeli establishment, irrespective of party affiliations, defended the attack as a measure of pre-emptive self-defense in a long-standing policy of flight by indignation that has gone under the rubric of the so-called Begin Doctrine, named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin the first Israeli to strike a hostile neighbor, in the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981, and since duplicated in Iraq itself, in 2007.

Those who were advocating in support of the strike contend that the strike was not only a tactical success but rather a strategic necessity. Over the past few months, international watchdog groups and even intelligence reports that had gotten out had claimed that Iran had increased their level of uranium enrichment to a level so close to weapons grade. It was almost solely a matter of time before this element was transformed to be a weapon, and Iran had stonewalled the IAEA investigators.

Although Iran denied publicly possessing the nuclear weapon, as Netanyahu alleged during his speech delivered in the Knesset, the country was only weeks, not months, away from assembling a machine. In this case, Israeli policymakers were afraid that the acting opportunity was shrinking fast, particularly with the world preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and South China Sea tensions.

This is not an unjustified criticism, the strike will promote nuclear plans in Tehran.

The decision was reinforced by strategic logic as well. The militants sponsored by Iran in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen had been attacking the Israeli territory at an increased rate, and the Israeli people were becoming very fed up with the government due to its perceived inactivity. The feeling of the loss of deterrence made Netanyahu pull the trigger.

According to proponents, Israel could once again regain deterrence by hitting through a pre-emptive striking force, establish supremacy in its military, and give back the regional balance of power. Even some defense analysts alleged that the attack might have put the Iranian nuclear development back by as many as several years through the destruction of valuable centrifuge stocks and the disruption of research groups.

This operation is very expensive, and the fallout may be very far-reaching. A few days after the Israeli attack, Iran responded by firing more than 100 ballistic missiles, as well as drones, into southern and central Israel. At least seven of the victims were civilians, and more than 80 were injured when one of the missiles hit Soroka Medical Centre in Beersheba.

The Iranian Supreme Leader criticized it as evil crimes towards humanity which were meted out by Israel, and warned of harsh and divine revenge. Hezbollah has been firing rocket salvos north of Israel, and the Houthis have been using drones launched in Yemen into Eilat. The threat of a multi-front war was imminent.

European officials such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and France President Emmanuel Macron called the strike risky, which would undo years of delicate diplomacy. European Union, despite sympathizing with Israel’s security needs, stated that military intervention has not been used in lieu of dialogue.

Nuclear development has become popular in Iran; even moderate political quarters have termed the Israeli attack as justification.

Iran immediately walked out of talks brokered by Oman with the United States, killing what was regarded by many as the final fling at restoring parts of the 2015 nuclear accord. The U.S. reaction was less categorical–Washington again reminded of the right of Israel to self-defense, but high-ranking managers of the Pentagon and the State Department complained that the operation had no long-term strategic vision, and it could only increase instability.

This is not an unjustified criticism. The long-term effectiveness of the strike is doubted. The most entrenched nuclear facilities of Iran, such as the Fordow facility, which is situated deep in the Zagros mountains, were spared. Other defense analysts observe that although the Israeli air force can strike the better distances, only the U.S. has the bunker-buster bombs to take care of such targets.

In their absence, the core capabilities of Iran may be degraded without being destroyed. More importantly, the record of such preemptive strikes is not too good. Following the Osirak attack in 1981, Iraq belatedly returned to secret nuclear activity. Likewise, Iran can now redouble down and not withdraw.

Additionally, a strategic paradox comes into action. Israel will wish to use the strike to deter Iran, but in the actual sense, the strike will promote nuclear plans in Tehran. Long-time Iranian hardliners, once denizens of the spectrum of skepticism pertaining to negotiations, are relieved and justified. The Supreme National Security Council has already started changing money to the hardened underground enrichment.

Nuclear development has become popular in Iran, and even moderate political quarters have termed the Israeli attack as indicative of the fact that Iran should procure a nuclear deterrent to secure its sovereignty. In this regard, the step taken by Netanyahu can prove to be a temporary solution that has hazardous long-term consequences.

The operation also creates further isolation of the pro-West voices in Iran. Although the blaming anger of the people has served the support the regime, the reformists and the civil society members have kept mum, fearing punishments and charges of disloyalty. At the same time, the diplomatic effect of the Israeli attack weakens Western influence. Over several years, the U.S and EU had been bargaining using waivers to limit uranium enrichment by Iran. These tools are now irrelevant given that military confrontation is on the foreground.

When it comes to the balance of deterrence and provocation, it speaks volumes about the fact that Netanyahu made his choice not by chance. However, the future result is still unknown. Suppose that the materialization of the Iranian nuclear dream is delayed successfully and that Tehran’s proxies will be tamed. It is indeed likely that Israel has achieved a strategic conquest.

However, the repercussions of the operation, which provokes a broader war in the region, empowers Iranian hardliners, and speeds up the process of weaponizing nuclear potential, can go disastrous for not only the Israeli state but the Middle East region in general.

Whether this gamble will succeed depends on shifting dynamics from firepower to diplomacy.

This operation is essentially a gamble when it comes down to brass tacks. Netanyahu is placing a major gamble that the premise of sterling force can achieve deterrence without inducing unparalleled escalation. History, however, indicates that these kinds of bets are usually accompanied by underlying expenses.

The situation in the region has already reached a knife-edge point, and what will happen in the coming few weeks now means the difference between Israel having made a decisive security stand or firing the starter pistol towards a broader conflict that Israel will not be able to control.

Whether this gamble will succeed will only be ascertained by how Israel and its allies are able now to shift dynamics of firepower to diplomacy and confrontation to containment. The grey area between these two action levels of deterrence and provocation will, till that time, be dangerously narrow.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.