The recent diplomatic undertakings by India to reopen its consulates in Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad have again brought to the fore the grave apprehensions of security in the region, especially with Pakistan and its western border. Even though Afghanistan as a sovereign state has all rights to chart its foreign policy and develop diplomatic ties wherever and with whomever it deems right, the spectre of the past actions by India in Afghanistan makes the motives behind such actions less than benign.

Indian consulates in Afghanistan have historically served as hubs of subversive activity targeting Pakistan.

Traditionally, the consulates located by India in these two strategically important regions of Afghanistan have never been just the place of culture exchange, trade promotion or even diplomatic liaison, quite on the contrary, they have always been the platforms of covert Indian operations aimed at organizing subversive and destabilizing agenda with the main target being Pakistan.

The fact that an Indian consulate member was allegedly wounded in Jalalabad in December 2024 indicates that Indian undercover operations in these territories have not been interrupted. Rather, they continue to remain a standing issue whereby they might fuel a new round of suspicion, proxy wars, and destabilization in an already delicate South Asian security apparatus.

The interests and aims of India in Afghanistan cannot be dissociated from its combination of the Chanakya doctrine, an old strategic ideology that views the other neighbouring states as eternal enemies and uses its neighbours accordingly as transient friends. This ideology transmitter is evident in the way India is dealing with Afghanistan, as its main goal does not appear to be the friendship of the Indian government with the Afghan people rather it was more of encircling and weakening Pakistan by subversive measures.

Reopening of these consulates is being projected as a mere diplomatic gesture, a move towards normalizing the ties with the Taliban-led Afghanistan, and reopening of these consulates as a goodwill gesture towards Afghanistan people. But the ground realities and the past trends indicate something different. Under the earlier regimes in Afghanistan, particularly during the rule of President Ashraf Ghani and his predecessor Hamid Karzai, the Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif were known to be actively engaged in gathering intelligence, subversion and provision of logistic support to anti-Pakistan forces, most specifically the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

The case of Kulbhushan Jadhav remains a reminder of India’s misuse of diplomatic cover for espionage.

There have been several occurrences over the decades that have indicated that these consulates have been used as havens, sources of funding, as well as depots of arms supply to these terror groups. Pakistan has already provided dossiers, intelligence inputs to international forums, and evidence to the effect that operatives of Indian agencies, deployed in these so-called diplomatic establishments, were involved in the financing, equipping, and guiding terror groups that had unleashed their devastating attacks on Pakistani territory.

The infamous example of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian Navy officer caught by the security agencies in Balochistan, will always serve as a reminder of how India has been misusing diplomatic cover in other states to carry out espionage and terrorism-related operations.

Indian assistance to the TTP and BLA elements through the Afghan soil is not only a matter of a fatal threat to the national security of Pakistan, but it is also an existential challenge to the sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan itself. India has in the past played a role in enhancing chaos in Afghanistan itself by enabling violent non-state actors. Any reversion of Indian consulates without concrete assurances of non-interference would mean the resurgence of these terror networks, which would not only be dangerous to the peace process in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan, where a fragile peace process is going on within the country.

Even as India might be posing as a developmental partner to Afghanistan, its history demonstrates that its interest in Afghanistan is merely based on its anti-Pakistan sentiments and has nothing to do with Afghanistan per se. This hypocrisy is crying clear since India gave an outrageous answer to the worst humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, after the panic-stricken US exit in 2021.

India disgracefully refuses to take in tens of thousands of desperate Afghans fleeing the country when the Taliban regained power, denying asylum to its so-called friends and partners. India denied even temporary protection or humanitarian aid, unlike Pakistan, which has hosted millions of Afghan refugees over decades, throwing the emptiness of its famed friendship.

India’s refusal to accept Afghan refugees or support Afghan students reveals the hollowness of its regional friendship claims.

In addition, the stamping of young Afghan students by India in 2022, when New Delhi issued a unilateral decision to withdraw the visas of about 2,500 Afghan students who had already received admission in Indian universities, revealed the selfishness of the Indian policy towards Afghanistan. These students, who are the hope of the new generation in Afghanistan, became helpless and hopeless, and their future was ruined just because India was not ready to take the slightest expenditure to keep its promises related to education. This abandonment also highlights the fact that Indian relations with Afghanistan are not principled but transactional and based on opportunities; it does not have any concern for the Afghan people.

The Afghan refugees who have crossed over to India have not been spared the harsh treatment, even though they have been able to do so. These refugees have been denied refugee status by the draconian Foreigner Acts in India and are in constant fear of arrest, detention, and deportation without any basic rights to legal employment, education, and health. This kind of treatment completely contrasts with the Indian propaganda of a benevolent neighbour or a regional humanitarian power.

It is not lost, also that at the time when the Najibullah government fell in the 1990s (when India enjoyed significant leverage over Afghan leaders), New Delhi betrayed its former ally, President Najibullah, who was desperately trying to get Indian assistance to fly out of Kabul, as the Taliban militia approached the city. The denial of safe passage to India to its protege Najibullah resulted in his grisly murder in the streets of Kabul – another stark reminder that India’s so-called friendship has strings and highly selfish provisions and that it is dumped in the first instance, its interests are no longer deemed to be served. The mentioned betrayals are not exceptions but elements of a behavioural pattern that the current government of Afghanistan should be aware of before getting into another foreign-manipulation trap.

Captured terrorists and intercepted communications frequently trace back to Indian handlers operating through Afghan soil.

With this alarming historical background, the international community, particularly the stakeholders with an interest in peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, ought to examine keenly the intentions of India in resurfacing with a diplomatic presence. Does India want to see Afghanistan rise, or is this just a tactical move by them to reinstate intelligence stations under diplomatic immunity to run anti-Pakistan activities? Concerns by Pakistan are not on a speculative basis only.

Captured arms, intercepted radio calls, and confessions by captured terrorists within Pakistan have on several occasions led back to Indian sources channelled through Afghanistan. Whether it is the supply of sophisticated communication equipment or the provision of explosives and money, the role of India has been noticed in various terror plans that the Pakistani security agencies have discovered and prevented.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Author

  • Prof. Andrea Francioni

    He is a member of the Association for Asian Studies (Ann Arbor), of The author is a member of the Association of Extra-European Studies (Pisa) and of the Italian Society of International History (Padua). His current research interests include the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and Western imperialism in China of the last Qing.

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