The Abraham Accords were once presented as a transformative moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, normalization with Israel promised technological cooperation, security dividends, and renewed favor in Washington. The accords symbolized a shift toward pragmatic state interests, signaling that the Gulf could move beyond the Palestinian question and position itself as an anchor of stability in a volatile region. Yet Israel’s recent attack on Qatar has reopened a pressing question: Is the Abraham Accords still a viable strategic choice for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?
Before the attack, Gulf states had pursued different paths toward normalization. The UAE and Bahrain led the charge, emphasizing economic opportunity and access to Israeli technology. Saudi Arabia, while stopping short of formal recognition, cautiously weighed the benefits against reputational costs at home and across the Muslim world. Kuwait held firmly to its traditional rejection of normalization. Qatar, despite earlier discreet engagement with Israel, kept its distance, balancing its mediation role in Palestinian affairs with domestic and regional sensitivities.
For those who joined, the attraction of the accords lay in hedging logic. Normalization was not only about Israel but also about securing Washington’s goodwill, attracting Western investment, and diversifying beyond traditional partners. For smaller states like Bahrain, it meant shelter under Emirati and American patronage. For the UAE, normalization was a vehicle to cement its image as a hub for innovation and diplomacy. Even Saudi Arabia found value in keeping the normalization debate alive, signaling utility to the U.S. while buying time to consolidate Vision 2030.
The Israeli strike on Qatar, however, disrupts this logic. An attack on a GCC member undermines Israel’s credibility as a partner for peace and stability. It shatters the narrative that normalization could reduce hostility and build cooperation. Instead, it exposes the fragility of the arrangement and the dangers of aligning with a state willing to target Gulf territory.
This rupture reverberates across GCC dynamics. Qatar’s skepticism toward normalization is reinforced. Kuwait’s rejectionist stance gains new legitimacy. For Saudi Arabia, already cautious, the attack strengthens the case for delay, if not disengagement. Even the UAE and Bahrain, early champions of the accords, now face mounting reputational costs. While reversing normalization may be unlikely, deepening it will be far harder to justify.
Public opinion compounds these challenges. Normalization with Israel was always deeply unpopular across the Arab world, including in the Gulf, where solidarity with the Palestinian cause remains strong in societal discourse. The Abraham Accords were advanced not through popular consensus but through top-down state decisions justified in the language of national interest and modernization. This has long reflected a broader state-society gap in the GCC, where governments pursue foreign policy initiatives that are often detached from, and at times in tension with, popular sentiment.
Israel’s attack on Qatar sharpens this divide. It energizes popular resistance to normalization, reinforcing perceptions that state elites are willing to prioritize external partnerships over regional solidarity and public opinion. For Gulf rulers, this poses reputational and legitimacy risks: the more normalization appears to contradict popular identity and regional cohesion, the harder it becomes to sustain without political costs. Leaders can no longer assume that normalization will remain insulated from public sentiment, especially when Israel’s actions directly target a fellow GCC member and resonate with long-standing societal skepticism.
Strategically, the Abraham Accords risk becoming less a hedge than a liability. Their original promise was flexibility: access to Israeli technology and U.S. goodwill without abandoning other relationships. Yet Israel’s aggression narrows rather than expands options, pushing Gulf states toward a binary choice: either defend ties with a partner that undermines regional solidarity or reconsider the value of the accords altogether. Hedging works by keeping multiple pathways open; normalization now risks closing them.
What emerges instead is the possibility of recalibrated hedging. Gulf states may increasingly look toward mid-tier powers such as Turkey, India, and Pakistan to provide the economic, technological, and security partnerships once envisioned through normalization. These actors offer transactional benefits without the reputational risks of association with Israel. Turkey’s active diplomacy, India’s expanding economic footprint, and Pakistan’s deep cultural, labor, and security ties with the Gulf provide alternative avenues for diversification. In this context, the Abraham Accords may be reduced to transactional deals rather than the strategic foundation once touted.
Still, the accords are not dead. The UAE and Bahrain have invested too heavily to walk away, and Washington will continue to push for their preservation as part of its Middle East strategy. Yet the political legitimacy of normalization has been severely eroded. Even if relations persist, they will lack the aura of inevitability that once surrounded them.
The attack on Qatar forces a fundamental reconsideration: is the Abraham Accords truly a path to security and integration, or does it expose the Gulf to new vulnerabilities and internal division? The logic of normalization was often sold to Gulf societies as a safeguard against regional threats, a means of gaining access to advanced defense technologies and aligning more closely with Washington through Israel. Yet the attack on a GCC member underscores that even if states sign on, their security is not guaranteed.
On the contrary, it illustrates that normalization cannot shield them from Israeli aggression or prevent Gulf sovereignty from being undermined. For the GCC, the answer increasingly leans toward the latter: normalization is less a protective shield than a potential liability. It is no longer the bold strategic choice it appeared to be in 2020 but risks becoming a political and strategic burden at a time when Gulf states are seeking maximum flexibility in a multipolar environment.
The Abraham Accords promised a leap forward for Gulf strategy. Today, they stand as a reminder that partnerships without trust or respect for sovereignty cannot deliver stability. For the GCC, the central question is no longer whether normalization with Israel is possible, but whether it remains desirable at all.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
