In the book “Unrestricted Warfare”, the authors analyze the U.S. military policy during different wars. They conclude that the days are gone when wars were fought merely with military muscle. Instead, they added, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and political tools are also a key part of modern warfare, to bring the enemy to their knees. The use of unconventional strategies, with constant adaptation, manipulation, and unpredictability, is the defining feature of the wars propagated by the major powers today.

Interestingly, China is using similar tactics in the South China Sea to exert its claims over 80-90% of territorial waters that fall under the jurisdiction of neighboring states as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Based on the philosophy of Sun Tzu and its revolutionary past, China adopts Grey Zone strategies in the disputed region of the South China Sea. This approach helps China achieve its tactical objectives without triggering an actual war with the states having overlapping claims in the so-called 9-dash line.

China adopts Grey Zone strategies in the South China Sea to achieve objectives without triggering actual war.

China’s approach varies from state to state. For instance, as the report says, China is more into bullying weaker states and exerts few measures against relatively powerful states such as Japan. The Taiwan-Philippines dyad is heavily affected by the recent escalations. Based on the available data, Chinese Grey Zone Tactics (GZTs) can be categorized into two: Low Intensity and High Intensity.

In the execution process, China uses different means (e.g., military, economic, and cyber warfare) at different levels (e.g., international, bilateral, and grassroots) to achieve its desired goals that vary from case to case. These measures, as advocated by Sun Tzu, are aimed at breaking the will of the enemy to fight. The matter becomes intense given the geopolitical significance of the South China Sea and the involvement of great powers such as the U.S.

This research addresses the following questions: Why are GZTs problematic? What are the most common methods China adopts in the South China Sea to execute its Grey Zone Tactics? How Philippines and Taiwan affected by the imperial claims of China? What is the perspective of International law on this issue? What steps can affected states take to tackle this threat?

Multiple and contrasting definitions of Grey Zone Tactics exist. This study uses the least controversial definition of Hal Brands and further extends its scope to incorporate the evolving geopolitical proximities. Grey Zone Tactics is neither a new concept in politics nor a compelling legal concept. Instead, this metaphorical term can be used to describe an assertive behavior by a certain actor to achieve the desired geopolitical goals while ensuring that escalation remains below the threshold level.

These tactics blur the line between war and peace, kinetic and non-kinetic force.

In other words, these tactics blur the line between kinetic and non-kinetic use of force on the one hand, and lie at the cusp of war and peace on the other hand. Usually, a weaker state adopts such of technique because of an inferior military posture against the powerful state. But, given the strategic restrains posed by the existing international system, powerful states too have shifted their attention towards this domain.

Horizontally, Michael T. Mazarr has developed a scale to measure the intensity of these tactics by the revisionist states. He ranks China and Russia on a scale, with the former being less assertive. Vertically, focusing merely on China’s behavior towards neighboring states, RAND’s report shows that Taiwan and the Philippines have been the most affected states by these tactics. Beijing’s motive behind these tactics is to change the status quo of the South China Sea, deter the United States from interfering in the regional affairs, monopolize the natural resources in the region, and extend its sphere of influence.

Here arises a question: why does China adopt these indirect tactics instead of direct military operations like Russia? The answer lies in Beijing’s official position at the international level as a peaceful rising state with excessive focus on economic progress and development.

Any misadventure would deteriorate China’s traditional viewpoint, ultimately leading to international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, something Beijing is not prepared for. Though the world is looking at the Beijing Consensus as a potential alternative to the U.S.-led Washington Consensus, states are not willing to risk their economic and political ties with the United States in case they have to choose sides between the two.

China is well aware of this fact, and the fear of isolation deters Beijing from taking kinetic actions. Moreover, China is afraid of confrontation with the United States as the latter is committed to opposing any use of force to change the status quo of the region, particularly Taiwan. Above all, “Three Warfare Doctrine,” these tactics are not new for China. It has been preparing for it since 2003. This preparedness gives it an edge in maneuvering the potential retaliation.

International law struggles to categorize or counter these tactics due to their legal ambiguity.

China uses military and paramilitary forces to achieve its objectives. The military methods involve patrolling, military drills, violating airspace, threatening civilian aircraft and ships from passing through the South China Sea, and missile tests near or inside the territorial waters of the target states. Above all, it uses militia in this kind of operation. As Bryan Mabee puts it, nowadays, the re-emergence of private militia has been witnessed in conflicts. It had been a part of China’s official policy to use militias in international operations, given the shortcomings of the PLA in the late 1980s. However, China shows strategic ambiguity in this matter in the present context.

In non-kinetic measures, China uses cyberwarfare to mold public opinion in the targeted states. As said earlier, the motive varies from case to case. Mostly, these tactics are directed to exert political pressure, deter neighboring states from alignment with the U.S., and gradually strengthen its historical claims over the disputed waters. For instance, routine patrolling of the H-6K bomber around Paracel Island shows China’s bid for Neo-Normal in the region.

Although China directs GZTs throughout the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Philippines have been affected the most. Vietnam also qualifies for the list, but not debated to narrow the scope of this study. Since its rise as an economic giant, China has started harassing Taiwan and has propagated the One-China policy. In response to changing political events in Taiwan, particularly its first democratic presidential election since 1996, the Chinese tactics have evolved from verbal threats to deliberate aggression. China’s research vessels and dredging ships in the territorial waters of Taiwan have increased since 2019. The incidents of crossing the median line and patrolling across the Southwestern part of Taiwan have also surged.

The SW part of the Taiwan Strait is the most important route for international shipping, and it lies closer to Penghu Island. If China succeeded in controlling this part, the next island chain, such as that of Dongsa and Taiping, would be easier to block. Ultimately, it would lead to complete control over Taiwan. Another tactic China has started using is the use of drones inside the territory of Taiwan. It is costly for Taiwan to shoot these drones with the traditional anti-ballistic missiles.

China uses the footage of Taiwanese soldiers throwing stones at these drones to mock the security system of Taiwan. It serves two purposes as outlined by Sun Tzu: it rains resources due to excessive military readiness, and imposes psychological superiority over Taiwan. Apart from that, China conducted drills in response to the visit of the U.S. officials a few years ago, sending a political message of not aligning with China’s rivals.

Similarly, escalation with the Philippines has increased. In a recent horrific incident, more than 190 civilian boats appeared near Whitsun Reef, a disputed region between China and the Philippines. When intercepted by the respective navy, the fishermen said, “We are just seeking shelter from bad weather”. This did not match with the positioning and the strategic movement of these ships, which are blamed to be run by China’s China-backed trained militias.

Also, China had rejected the decision of an international tribunal in 2016, which denied China’s imperialist claims over the South China Sea. Apart from that, the disruption of Filipino fishing operations and naval ships by the Chinese vessels, the installation of floating barriers, and drilling in disputed waters are the defining elements in China’s silent offensive against the Philippines.

While looking into the matter, one can think about why international law is silent on this subject matter. A careful examination of the relevant articles in the context of the South China Sea is the least discussed by the experts. Instead, geopolitics dominates international legal norms in most of the academic work. The following paragraphs present a holistic overview to address this ambiguous question.

So, one aspect of Grey Zone Tactics is the accusations that China is using force or threatening to use it against the neighboring states in the South China Sea. From the perspective of International Law, the legalities involving the use of force are the subject matter of Article 2(4) of the UN charter. It prohibits States from using actual force or threatening to use force for any purpose. Importantly, it is a jus cogens principle. As the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case shows, it’s a customary norm, and no derogation from it is allowed in any case. However, the situation in the South China Sea is perplexing. China uses militia in aggressive acts against states.

These private entities are not the subject of Article 2(4). Secondly, if Chinese naval forces use aggressive actions, they use them in a grey zone manner. In other words, the calculated and swift actions do not fall under the jurisdiction of the use of force principle. If sued in the relevant forums, it is difficult to prove the use of force by China, given the complex process and the requirement of evidence that are often missing in the given scenario. Interestingly, the affected states cannot use force to retaliate against these measures as these tactics do not comply with the self-defense principle of the United Nations (Article 51). In a nutshell, strategic constraint is the only option left for the affected states.

Similarly, the use of maritime militia prevents China from falling into the domain of other customary rules. To qualify for the procedures of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the crime must be committed by the official representatives or the authorities of the state under the instructions of that particular state. Additionally, the state must accept or acknowledge these actions.

Apart from that, another point highlighted is why the international humanitarian law (IHL) is silent on the loss of lives or injuries to private individuals of the state? As the common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention states, the IHL becomes applicable when two states are fighting with each other, irrespective of the intensity. In the given case, however, the other state barely replies kinetically. However, the application of the commentary of the ICRC (2017) categorizes these tactics as an armed conflict.

Yet, it depends on how states present their cases or publicize such incidents. The principle of proportionality under general international law is also problematic, as the retaliation could cause serious injuries or loss of life to the alleged state-sponsored fisherman or private individuals who were assigned the task of only creating disruption in the targeted area instead of confrontation. Similarly, BPUFF and CCLEO face similar constraints. Nevertheless, the clear violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), with its clear demarcation of territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and High Seas, is witnessed in China’s case.

Taiwan and the Philippines are the most affected states by China’s strategic coercion.

In conclusion, one can say that the ambiguous nature of China’s unconventional warfare in the form of grey zone tactics prevents states from approaching international legal institutions. But if the affected states form an official alliance against these tactics, the situation could be better. For that, states must accept the evolving nature of warfare. Instead of focusing on traditional military buildup and new defense pacts with the U.S., the affected states must directly talk to Beijing regarding their concerns.

From the Chinese perspective, the United States is using these states to counter China, similar to what it did with the former U.S.S.R. Vietnam, over time, has balanced its ties with Beijing, and it has yielded positive results. Similarly, the Philippines and Taiwan should arrange direct trilateral talks with China over this issue, and must focus on the areas of common interest and trust-building measures. Instead of becoming a part of the unholy great game between China and the U.S., the advocacy for regionalism and complex interdependence is the key to resolving the existing issues.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.