The Israeli-Iranian conflict is one of the most unstable forms of rivalry in the Middle East that has a deep ideological and strategic nature linked with the conflict of visions of the Middle East. The cold proxy war has had to turn into more and more explicit clashes that have seen cyberattacks, airstrikes, and direct military threats. Although this war might seem geographically failing from affecting South Asia, its effects are also being experienced in this region, even in Pakistan. Given that Pakistan is located in a strategic position at the border between South Asia and the Middle East, the country is slowly getting engulfed in the spillover effects of this developing animosity.

The Israeli-Iranian conflict is one of the most unstable forms of rivalry in the Middle East.

The close ties between Pakistan and Iran, as well as the Arab Gulf states, interfere with its foreign policy decision-making. Although it borders and is historically associated with Iran, it develops its economy with the help of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. On top of this are issues of Pakistan, which strongly believes in not recognizing Israel because of its stand in the Palestinian cause. Islamabad is confronted with this triangular tension because of the need to subserve its national interests carefully and at the same time retain strategic neutrality.

This paper aims to target the effects of the Iran-Israel conflict on the affairs of Pakistan based on five concepts involving strategic security, sectarian politics, foreign policy, economic weaknesses, and diplomacy. This is aimed at evaluating how continuation or worsening of this war would influence internal stability and regional disposition of Pakistan.

The Israel-Iran conflict also affects Pakistan in one of the most direct ways, that is, through the regional security perspective. Iran is the immediate western neighbor of Pakistan, and any serious war involving Iran poses a threat of destabilizing the region. In case the conflict is turned into direct war or it is drawn into the regional interests like the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Hezbollah, provinces of western Pakistan, especially Balochistan, may encounter spillover effects. Insurgency and the cross-border tensions in Balochistan are already ripe, and the presence of sectarian militant groups further spices up the picture.

Strategic overstretch is another question in general. Armed with such military resources, Pakistan has managed to maintain a delicate balance in the allocation of its military capabilities on both the eastern and the western borders. An unstable Iran or Gulf will demand more resources on the part of Pakistan in terms of its western front, thus influencing its strategic plans towards India. Moreover, it may lead to an increase in the flows of refugees, illegal weapons circulation, and militant migration, so that the security activity and intelligence management should be enhanced.

Sectarian divides in Pakistan may be aggravated by the increasing intensity of the Iran-Israel conflict.

The Pakistani society has always had a hectic fracture in terms of sectarianism. The Shiite-Sunni conflict that was once observed to be institutionally and community mediated has reemerged occasionally in the form of violence. Sectarian divides in Pakistan may be aggravated by the increasing intensity of the Iran-Israel conflict, which is also characterized by an element of sectarian nature given the fact that Iran is a Shia state, whereas its adversaries in the region are both the Sunni dominated Arab states that are formal allies of Israel and Sunni jihadist groups.

The sectarian violence has occurred in the past in cities like Quetta, Karachi, and Parachinar. Groups that engage in militancy and are externally funded and ideologically supported usually use the regional tensions to rationalize their attacks at home. A more empowered sectarian discourse fuelled by foreign rivalry would intensify the dispute and divide the communities within Pakistan further, which may result in more acts of attacks on religious processions, worship places, and target killings.

The Pakistani state should exercise caution in ensuring hate speech is stopped, funding to religious groups by foreign agencies should be checked, and sectarian tolerance encouraged to ensure there is no destabilization in the country.

The foreign policy of Pakistan has always been based on strategic independence and non-participation in Middle Eastern politics. Nevertheless, the Israel-Iran conflict gives thought to a major challenge to this doctrine. Pakistan has friendly relations with Iran, though guarded. The two nations have been collaborating in border security, trade, and the management of refugees. However, the relationships are often caught up in sectarian matters and the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, which remains stagnant, and also the fact that Iran is opening up to India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has an economic and defence relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These are states that are increasingly inching closer to Israel as normalization efforts continue to take shape under the Abraham Accords. Since these Arab neighbors complicitly position themselves in opposition to Iran in collusion with Israel, Pakistan is increasingly being pressurized into doing the same or be shunned.

It is harder and harder to be neutral.

It is harder and harder to be neutral. Islamabad will have to practice sensitive diplomacy by focusing on conflict resolution, stability improvements in the region, and support of the Palestinian cause that it has so far maintained according to its teachings, without directly acting against a bloc.

Another economic implication of the Israel-Iran conflict is that it affects the energy security and the inflow of remittances towards Pakistan. Pakistan has to rely more on oil imports, and most of the energy is obtained from the Gulf. The occurrence of any military hype in the Strait of Hormuz, where the main part of the global oil moves, is capable of causing a hike in oil prices and a failure in supply. It would further burden the already weak economy of Pakistan, which is bedeviled by inflation, currency devaluation, and an ever-growing gap in the current account.

In addition, the diaspora contributing to the Pakistani economy through foreign exchange is mainly the remittances of Pakistanis in the Gulf. A local war may result in unemployment, expulsion of labor forces, and liquidity. This would directly affect the foreign reserves of Pakistan as well as the capacity of Pakistan to cover overseas debt.

The economic diversification and partnering with various nations like Central Asia and China should be given priority to lessen the overdependence on the Middle East.

The war has revived arguments both within Pakistan and among academicians in Pakistan about whether they can consider having an engagement with Israel. Although the governments that took over power on various occasions have all supported the policy of non-recognition of Palestine in good solidarity, the new dynamics in the region have resulted in claims of reexamination. The nationalists claim that Israel’s admission would open up international doors, diplomatic and economic opportunities, such as exposure to developed technology and improved relations with the West.

Nevertheless, there is an enormous risk of a pushback by the religious bodies, the mass population, and Iran in case of such a policy change. It will also make it harder to rationalise the Pakistani story on Kashmir, since for years, the comparison of Palestine and Kashmir has been a stumbling block in Pakistani foreign policy.

Normalization with Israel might be seen as taking sides, harming relations with Tehran and internal sectarian peace.

In case of the Iran-Israel disputes, normalization with Israel might be seen as a move of taking sides, which may harm the relations with Tehran as well as prove dangerous to internal sectarian peace.

The Israeli-Iranian war makes the situation complicated for Pakistan. The security threats and sectarian sensibilities, economic vulnerabilities, and foreign policy questions bring out the geopolitical vulnerability of Pakistan in an integrated regional order. In Islamabad, even though the city has been able to observe a careful neutrality until now, the tension is about to make such a policy more unsustainable.

In an act of reciprocity, Pakistan needs to adopt a multi-faceted approach which involves securitization of the border, inter-sect peace, energy diversification, and reinforcing its efforts on mediation of the peace process in the region. Most importantly, it has to pursue national interests as it goes through the ideological and strategic fault line of the modern-day Middle East.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.